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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Standard form contracts appear to present a problem for the effi-
ciency claims of those adhering to the positive law and economics 
school.1 Indeed, if we envision economic bargaining as movements 
within an Edgeworth box toward the Pareto set,2 one does not quite 
know what to do with standard form contracts. This disconnect be-
tween bargaining theory and empirical observation led some legal 
scholars to view form contracts as adhesion contracts, implying that 
they are the result of a powerful party thrusting its preferences on a 
helpless party.3 The take-it-or-leave-it nature of these contracts, 
which are generally drafted by the seller of a good or service, casts 
doubt on the usual assumption that market competition maximizes 
consumer surplus. 
 However, the idealized world of the Edgeworth box does not dis-
cuss the process by which buyers and sellers choose a particular 
point on the core of the contract curve within the box, and in reality, 
those dynamics will be beset by transactions costs.4 Because those 
transactions costs reduce total surplus, individuals will have the in-
centive to mitigate them. Market forces, then, will tend to drive 
profit-maximizing sellers to settle on standard contract terms that 
                                                                                                                    
 * Assistant Professor of Law and Courtesy Professor of Economics, Florida State 
University; Ph.D. (economics) and J.D., George Mason University. 
 1. For a discussion of the lines of separation among the major movements in law and 
economics, see Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The 
Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431 (2004). 
 2. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 515-25 (1995). An 
Edgeworth box is a graphical device which may be used to depict a simple economy with 
two commodities and two consumers. Id. at 515-16. The Pareto set is the collection of all 
“Pareto optimal allocations”—outcomes to which “there is no alternative feasible outcome 
at which every individual in the economy is at least as well off and some individual is 
strictly better off.” Id. at 522-23. 
 3. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943). 
 4. Defining a determinative solution to which point will be reached along the con-
tract curve is a difficult task and requires some fairly restrictive assumptions. For one ex-
ample of how scholars have attempted to solve this problem, see John F. Nash, Jr., The 
Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 155-62 (1950).  
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are optimal in terms of maximizing total surplus generated through 
trade.5 Standardizing terms eliminates the need for a producer to 
bargain with all of his customers individually, saving the attendant 
costs of bargaining, including the agency costs involved in delegating 
bargaining authority to nonowner operators. Cooter and Ulen make a 
point to differentiate between standardized contracts that increase 
efficiency and contracts of adhesion that result from a seller’s mo-
nopoly position in the market.6 
 In judging the welfare implication of standardization, then, Cooter 
and Ulen suggest that the important question is whether the under-
lying market is competitive or monopolistic.7 Posner echoes this when 
he writes that the important consideration is “whether competition 
forces sellers to incorporate in their standard contracts terms that 
protect the purchasers.”8 
 This efficiency view implies that in competitive markets, stan-
dardized terms will benefit buyers. A corollary to this is that if we 
observe “abusive” standardized terms, the market is presumptively 
monopolistic. Casual observation suggests that standardized con-
tracts are nearly ubiquitous,9 and a great many of the standardized 
terms appear to benefit the seller to the potential detriment of the 
buyer. 
 What can we make of this inconvenient mismatch between theory 
and data? If abusive contract terms are the norm, does that imply 
that many markets are monopolistic? Such a deduction flies in the 
face of modern industrial organization, which suggests that the con-
ditions required for competition are relatively lenient. The theory of 
contestable markets tells us that as long as market entry and exit 
are reasonably easy, markets will generate competitive outcomes.10 
Further, contestable markets theory implies that technological ad-
vances will lead to easier entry and greater competition. While we 
should be observing increasing competition, we also appear to be see-
ing an increase in the use of supposedly abusive standardized con-
tract terms. 
                                                                                                                    
 5. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 116 (6th ed. 2003). 
 6. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 288 (4th ed. 2004). 
 7. Id. at 289. 
 8. POSNER, supra note 5, § 4.8, at 116. 
 9. For example, Hillman and Rachlinski suggest that “[p]eople encounter standard 
forms in most of their contractual endeavors.” Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435 (2002) (citing 
John J.A. Burke, Contracts as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. 285, 290 (2000)). 
 10. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 4-5 (rev. ed. 1988); William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Up-
rising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982); William J. Baumol 
et al., Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure: Reply, 73 AM. 
ECON. REV. 491 (1983). 
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 Inconvenient empirical observations such as this have provided 
the major impetus for the behavioral economics movement. When 
parsimonious models constructed from concave utility functions 
failed to provide implications that survive testing, some economists 
began to look to psychology for insights to explain the data. While 
there are certainly gains from interdisciplinary trade to be exploited, 
many law and economics scholars seem to forget what the compara-
tive advantage of economic analysis is: Economic theory generates 
testable hypotheses about cross-sectional and time-series variation in 
behavior.  
 Once theories are rigorously tested, they can provide insight for 
policy. If the theory fails to be supported by the data, we should re-
ject the theory, not the method. Lack of empirical support does not 
suggest that some other particular explanation is correct; it merely 
indicates that the tested theory is not correct. In the early stages of 
the behavioral economics movement, too often researchers have sim-
ply taken some anomalous behavior observed in the lab and used it 
as the presumptive null hypothesis that is accepted when the tested 
hypothesis, generated by theory, is rejected. 
 This research strategy could be profitable if the empirical tests 
were particularly powerful. However, for most applications, while the 
microfoundations of the economic theory are reasonably well speci-
fied, the behavioral explanation is often invoked without specifying 
its foundations. Such an asymmetry leaves little confidence that a 
powerful empirical test can be designed. 
 Fortunately, it appears as though we are on the cusp of a more 
sophisticated integration of psychological insights into the ex ante 
assumptions of economic models. This “second-wave behavioral eco-
nomics” moves beyond the ex post rationalizations of anomalous em-
pirical results and ad hoc criticisms of conventional economic theory 
by helping to fill out some of the microfoundations of behavior with-
out abandoning useful economic methods for generating and testing 
hypotheses.11 This movement will eventually allow economic research 
to better inform policy and judicial decisions. However, until the 
movement becomes sufficiently embedded and developed, it is prema-
ture to use first-stage behavioral criticisms to supplant insights from 
conventional economics in the public decisionmaking process. 
 In the meantime, law and economics scholars working on applied 
issues should be careful not to invoke behavioral explanations—
developed atheoretically on the basis of observation as opposed to 
rigorous testing—simply because existing economic theory is not 
borne out empirically. Instead, we should adopt behavioral explana-
                                                                                                                    
 11. For a helpful discussion of the integration of this “second-wave,” see Matthew 
Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 657 (2002). 
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tions only if they can explain systematic cross-sectional and time-
series variation, while keeping in mind that conventional theory 
might provide some unexplored insights. 
 Standard form contracts provide an illustration of an application 
for which a behavioral explanation has been suggested because con-
ventional theory has not yet been predictive of empirical observation. 
Work by Russell Korobkin provides the strongest argument that 
bounded rationality and status quo bias lay at the foundation of 
“abusive” standardized terms and lays out the policy implications of 
these biases.12  
 However, although these behavioral biases are consistent with 
casual observation of the incidence of standard form contracts, stan-
dard economic theory provides an unexplored explanation that is 
consistent with the casual empirics too. Specifically, standard form 
contracts can exist in fairly competitive markets if consumers exhibit 
heterogeneity in time values and sellers can engage in price dis-
crimination on the basis of that heterogeneity through the use of 
standardized contracts. By accepting default terms, high-time-value 
individuals acquire the product at a higher quality-adjusted price 
without expending time to dicker over individual contract terms. 
Low-time-value individuals, on the other hand, willingly expend time 
haggling over unattractive terms to secure a lower quality-adjusted 
price. 
 This Comment reviews Korobkin’s argument regarding behavioral 
bias as the root of standardized contract terms that favor sellers. 
Part II briefly discusses the correlates of these biases, suggested by 
experimental work, that will be useful in generating predictions 
about cross-sectional variation. Part III presents the price discrimi-
nation model of standardized contracts. Part IV concludes with a dis-
cussion of what empirical evidence would provide powerful support 
for the competing explanations of standardized contracts. 
II.   STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS AS ARTIFACTS OF BEHAVIORAL BIAS 
 In a series of articles, Russell Korobkin has isolated two behav-
ioral biases that contribute to the existence of standard form con-
tracts.13 Status quo bias is the tendency of individuals to accept exist-
ing or default orderings as normative or preferred simply because the 
ordering constitutes the status quo.14 In the contract case, this bias 
                                                                                                                    
 12. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Un-
conscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1208-44 (2003).  
 13. See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract 
Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Korobkin, su-
pra note 12. 
 14. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Mak-
ing, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8-10 (1988). For a formal incorporation of status quo bias 
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manifests itself in an individual’s propensity to accept default or 
form terms without bargaining over them to achieve more favorable 
terms.15 However, while status quo bias might explain why Coasian 
bargaining does not take place in individual transactions, it is less 
powerful as an explanation of why abusive terms could exist in equi-
librium. We would expect competitive forces to eliminate abusive 
terms in the long run, because consumers would be drawn to sellers 
offering more attractive standard terms as long as search costs are 
low and entry is easy. 
 To explain the durability of abusive terms, Korobkin invokes the 
notion of bounded rationality, suggesting that consumers will not 
consider all dimensions of product quality because of a limited ability 
to process complex information.16 While consumers will pay attention 
to and bargain over salient terms, such as price, they will ignore non-
salient terms.17 Sellers will have the incentive to exploit this limited 
rationality by proposing abusive non-salient terms and competing 
only on the basis of salient terms.18 
 Korobkin provides substantial experimental evidence that con-
sumers disregard some product attributes in their decisionmaking.19 
For example, one review of existing studies cited by Korobkin sug-
gests that consumers generally only compare three products and that 
the comparison focuses on no more than five product dimensions,20 
although there does appear to be heterogeneity across consumers21 
depending on the individuals’ processing abilities.22 
 Given that consumers will generally consider fewer than the total 
number of distinct product attributes, Korobkin suggests that con-
tract terms will often be ignored as consumers devote their attention 
and information-processing resources to comparing salient attributes 
such as price, appearance, and product function.23 Further, even if 
consumers wanted to compare products based on a multitude of 
terms, behavioral research suggests that individuals have difficulties 
                                                                                                                    
in a rational choice framework, see Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Efe A. Ok, Rational Choice 
with Status Quo Bias, 121 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (2005).  
 15. See Korobkin, supra note 13. 
 16. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1226-29. 
 17. Id. at 1229-34. 
 18. See id. at 1234. 
 19. Id. at 1226-29. 
 20. See Denis A. Lussier & Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent 
Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 154, 155 (1979). 
 21. Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Decision 
Making: A Replication and Extension, 24 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 
300 (1979). 
 22. See James Onken et al., Individual Differences in the Use of Simplification Strate-
gies in a Complex Decision-Making Task, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. 
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 14 (1985). 
 23. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1230. 
560  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:555 
 
in making trade-offs over dissimilar product attributes.24 That is, 
consumers might be unwilling to implicitly price some product at-
tributes, particularly those attributes with strong emotional implica-
tions, such as safety.25 Even if individuals were willing to make 
trade-offs regarding these emotion-laden attributes, Korobkin draws 
on the experimental evidence that individuals are generally poor 
probabilistic thinkers to suggest that individuals will make these 
trade-offs inefficiently when it comes to terms that only bind with 
low probability, such as arbitration requirements.26 
 Korobkin argues that as firms compete on the basis of salient 
product attributes, they have an incentive to offer inefficient non-
salient contract terms.27 That is, if individuals pay the most attention 
to price, sellers will use their savings from providing low-quality (ig-
nored) contract terms to lower prices, lowering the total surplus gen-
erated from trade.28 
 Korobkin provides numerical examples in which competition over 
salient features leads to an efficiency loss in situations where sali-
ence is homogenous across consumers, heterogeneous but randomly 
distributed across consumers, heterogeneous across strategic con-
sumers, and endogenous.29 In each case, Korobkin argues that the 
likelihood of sellers finding it profitable to offer only efficient contract 
terms regarding non-salient features is vanishingly low, leading to 
aggregate welfare losses.30 
 To remedy this possibility of equilibrium inefficient contract 
terms, Korobkin suggests that courts enforce all terms that were 
clearly salient ex ante, as well as terms for which this determination 
is ambiguous.31 Litigants wishing to invalidate a particular term 
should be required to present evidence of its non-salience and its in-
efficiency.32 If the court determines that the contested term was non-
salient and inefficient, it should allow for significant penalties in or-
der to incentivize sellers to draft efficient contract terms.33 
 Regarding the determination of what constitutes an efficient term, 
Korobkin suggests that litigants could present studies detailing the 
                                                                                                                    
 24. Id.  
 25. See id.; Jane Beattie & Jonathan Baron, Investigating the Effect of Stimulus 
Range on Attribute Weight, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & 
PERFORMANCE 571, 571 (1991). 
 26. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1232-34.  
 27. Id. at 1234.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 1232-41. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 1280.  
 32. Id. at 1280-81. 
 33. See id. at 1284-90 (suggesting nonenforcement as a default remedy for uncon-
scionable terms). 
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relative values of buyers’ willingness to pay for high- and low-quality 
contract terms net of the marginal savings to the seller in providing 
the low-quality term.34 Such studies, however, will be plagued by 
many problems. Analysis of market data would not be possible, pre-
sumably, given the assumption that the term is non-salient. There-
fore, it is unlikely buyers will have priced the term. On the other 
hand, survey results come with their own substantial shortcomings.35 
Recognizing that this kind of direct evidence might be difficult to col-
lect, Korobkin defaults to the efficiency precepts that are presented 
in the law and economics literature, such as assigning risks to the 
party best able to minimize expected losses.36 
 Korobkin’s explanation and examples are rhetorically persuasive. 
Further, his argument is advanced by the significant laboratory evi-
dence of individuals’ behavioral biases.37 Before we adopt his pre-
scriptions, however, it might be profitable to inquire whether his hy-
pothesis stands up to empirical testing. The argument certainly is 
consistent with the casual observation that potentially abusive con-
tract terms can be found in the real world. However, it is not clear 
that the bounded rationality explanation is the best explanation for 
this observation.38 
 A handful of limitations or potential inconsistencies inherent in 
the model that is implicit behind Korobkin’s illustrations might limit 
its acceptability a priori. The most obvious inconsistency is the dif-
ferent treatment of buyers and sellers. While buyers are assumed to 
suffer from significant behavioral biases that are not corrected in any 
evolutionary sense,39 sellers are assumed to be able to capitalize on 
these biases, despite the fact that doing so would require significant 
information and information-processing capabilities.40 Perhaps the 
feedback mechanisms on the supply side are stronger, making seller 
biases more costly and leading to their remedy through attrition of 
                                                                                                                    
 34. See id. at 1284. 
 35. See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some 
Number Better than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1994, at 45 (discussing the 
flaws of contingent value surveys). 
 36. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1284. 
 37. Id. at 1225-33.  
 38. In truth, it is not at all clear that abusive terms do exist. Despite Korobkin’s cita-
tion of canonical law and economics literature on what constitutes efficiency in these con-
texts, some scholars, such as James Buchanan, would argue that value maximization is 
tautologically the result of trade. “Individuals make their evaluations of the two commodi-
ties only as the trading process takes place, and, without trade, there could be no means of 
determining what value is at all.” GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE 
REASON OF RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 28 (2000). Thus, any evaluation 
of efficiency independent of the trading is impossible. For further discussion of this point, 
see Parisi & Klick, supra note 1; and Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, Wealth, Utility, 
and the Human Dimension, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY (forthcoming 2005). 
 39. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1218-34. 
 40. See id. at 1234-39. 
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firms that fail to exploit buyer biases. However, one could argue that 
a court system that ruthlessly enforces contracts would make buyer 
biases more costly, leading to their mitigation or elimination. It is not 
at all clear that we are better off, in a dynamic sense, when existing 
biases are reinforced through the protective shield of courts. 
 Further, it is not evident from Korobkin’s presentation whether 
the low-price/inefficient non-salient-terms result is sustainable in 
equilibrium even in a system that enforces all contract terms. Korob-
kin too easily rejects the argument that consumers’ salience profiles 
will change once a low-probability event occurs, imposing a reputa-
tion cost on firms offering inefficient contract terms.41 This is a bit 
cavalier since much depends on the product involved and the salience 
differentials held by consumers. Formal modeling of the conditions 
under which reputation lacks disciplinary force might allow us to 
better target the areas where Korobkin’s prescriptions are most nec-
essary, without applying them across the board, even in situations 
where abusive contract terms are a disequilibrium phenomenon that 
will be remedied without judicial intervention. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, by asserting that such low-probability events will have little 
effect on seller incentives,42 Korobkin is unwittingly suggesting that 
the welfare increases from his prescriptions will be quite small and 
may well not be cost-justified, even if they require only trivial inquiry 
costs. That is, perhaps the reason that certain terms are systemati-
cally non-salient is because their ultimate importance is trivial. 
 Lastly, Korobkin’s examples assume that all markets are pooled 
such that sellers will offer all customers an identical product even if 
their preferences and salience profiles are heterogeneous.43 However, 
it could be the case that firms offer differentiated products to con-
sumers and use the standard form contract to engage in a type of 
price discrimination. While such price discrimination may fall short 
of first-best efficiency, it may be welfare-enhancing relative to the 
pooled equilibrium, suggesting that failure to enforce the standard-
ized terms would harm consumers as a group if the standardized 
contract is the most efficient way to sustain a separating equilib-
rium. This will be the subject of the following Part.44 
 Before scholars can attempt to investigate whether the bounded 
rationality model of form contracts fits the data better than these 
competing stories (or others that have not been mentioned), it is nec-
essary to identify the comparative statistics yielded by Korobkin’s 
argument. A theory must be predictive of variation to be powerful. As 
                                                                                                                    
 41. See id. at 1240. 
 42. See id.  
 43. See id. at 1235. 
 44. See infra Part III. 
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discussed above, our relative ignorance of the microfoundations of 
behavioral biases limits our ability to derive formal comparative sta-
tistics; improvement on this front will allow researchers to craft more 
powerful empirical tests. However, Korobkin’s article provides some 
clues as to what underlying variables should correlate well with sys-
tematic limitations in rationality.  
 For example, since it appears that individuals with superior cog-
nitive abilities can evaluate more product dimensions,45 we should 
expect that the likelihood of inefficient standardized terms decreases 
as average customer cognitive ability increases.  
 Another covariate suggested by Korobkin’s work involves con-
sumer heterogeneity.46 As variance in salience profiles in the market 
increases, we should expect that fewer terms are immune from com-
petitive pressures. This implies that markets with increasingly het-
erogeneous consumers should exhibit fewer inefficient standardized 
terms.  
 Lastly, despite Korobkin’s pessimism regarding the ability of 
reputation concerns to remedy inefficient standardized terms,47 on 
the margin, we should observe a lower likelihood of inefficient terms 
as average consumer experience in the market increases. That is, 
even with very small probability events, the more exposure consum-
ers have in a market, the higher the cumulative probability of an in-
dividually small probability event occurring. As such an event occurs 
for more individuals (and as publicity of these events spreads), we 
get closer to the tipping point between salient and non-salient for the 
inefficient standardized term. 
 Greg Mitchell offers some other sources of variation in behavioral 
bias in general.48 Some of these might prove to be systematically im-
portant in determining deviations from rationality in the contract con-
text specifically. Among these differences are sex differences,49 disposi-
tion differences,50 cultural differences,51 and developmental differ-
ences.52 Identifying the specific correlations between these characteris-
tics and the increasing propensity to make boundedly rational deci-
sions in contract-context experiments would help researchers develop 
powerful tests once they are ready to analyze field data. 
                                                                                                                    
 45. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1227-28 & n.83 (citing Olshavsky, supra note 21, 
at 314; Onken et al., supra note 22). 
 46. See id. at 1236-39.  
 47. See id. at 1239-41. 
 48. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 139-60 
(2002).  
 49. Id. at 140-42.  
 50. Id. at 142-47.  
 51. Id. at 147-56. 
 52. Id. at 156-60.  
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III.   PRICE DISCRIMINATION THROUGH STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS 
 Price discrimination occurs when multiple units of the “same” 
good are sold at unequal prices either to the same customer or to 
multiple customers.53 Although many discussions of price discrimina-
tion assume a significant degree of monopoly power on the part of the 
discriminator, price discrimination can exist in a zero-profit equilib-
rium in which total consumer welfare is improved relative to the 
nondiscriminatory case.54 For example, in markets where suppliers 
must pay a fixed cost before they can sell a product, each seller’s 
price must contain a return on the initial investment.55 If that return 
represents an economic profit, other firms will find it advantageous 
to enter the market, pushing the return down to the prevailing op-
portunity cost of funds. If firms can separate submarkets composed 
of low and high demanders, they can increase their up-front invest-
ment by recouping more of the investment from the high demanders 
and less from the low demanders. This price discrimination increases 
total output relative to the pooled equilibrium, increasing total wel-
fare.  
 In the monopolistic case, price discrimination allows the producer 
to extract more surplus from its trades, and consumer welfare can be 
increased relative to the nondiscriminatory monopoly case because of 
the attendant output increase that results from the discrimination.56 
In the extreme case of first-degree price discrimination, the competi-
tive output is produced as each consumer is charged his reservation 
price for each unit of the good.57 
 Without making any assumptions about the underlying market 
structures in which we observe standardized contracts,58 I conjecture 
that standardized contracts provide a mechanism by which firms can 
engage in second-degree price discrimination. Specifically, if a firm 
serves customers with varying time preferences, it can use its con-
tracts to extract greater surplus from high-time-value individuals, 
who are unwilling to dicker over multiple contract terms, without 
losing low-time-value customers, who are willing to bargain in order 
                                                                                                                    
 53. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133 (1988). 
 54. Id. at 139. 
 55.  For an illustration of this in the pharmaceutical industry, see Jonathan Klick, 
Drug Re-Importation’s No-Win Solution, REGULATION, Spring 2002, at 6.  
 56. The dynamic efficiency of this outcome is questionable given that if the monopoly 
position is sustainable, firms will dissipate the expected rents in trying to secure the mo-
nopoly. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. 
ECON. J. 224, 231 (1967). 
 57. TIROLE, supra note 53, at 136. 
 58. Indeed, it may well be the case that both zero-profit and monopoly-profit indus-
tries use standardized contracts to price discriminate. 
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to get the product at a lower real price. Effectively, bargaining is 
analogous to clipping coupons to get a better deal on a product.59 
 For illustration purposes, I modify a model first proposed by Ray-
mond Chiang and Chester Spatt.60 In that model, consumers differ in 
terms of their reservation price and time values.61 In order to extract 
more surplus from the high-time-value types, the seller bundles his 
good with a “bad” (for example, time spent waiting), allowing indi-
viduals to trade off time for a lower price.62 The model is presented in 
general terms, so Chiang and Spatt do not specify how time is traded 
for a lower price in the mathematics; but they offer some examples in 
their text, such as selling a good for a lower price in outlets that are 
located farther away from the majority of the population, charging 
more in outlets that have shorter wait times, or allowing bargaining 
over price.63 They also allow for generality concerning the number of 
consumer types, requiring only that the number be finite.64  
 To apply the model to the form contract context, I impose a bit 
more structure on the model and I restrict attention to two types of 
consumers: high-time-value individuals and low-time-value individu-
als. Further, to simplify the discussion, I assume that there are only 
two customers: one of each type. Lastly, with respect to the custom-
ers, I assume that the high-time-value individual also has a high res-
ervation price for the good, while the low-time-value person has a 
lower reservation price for the good.65 Thus, customer 1 values time 
at H units (measured in terms of a numeraire good) per unit of time 
spent waiting (t) and has a reservation value for the good of Hv . Cus-
tomer 2 values time at L units (again denominated in the numeraire) 
per t and has a reservation value of Lv . Ex ante the seller cannot dis-
tinguish between the two types, but he knows the underlying pa-
rameter values. 
 The seller of the good chooses the nominal price (p) and initially 
offers contract terms such that the real price of the good is 
( )0t p pβ = = . That is, if there is no bargaining (and thus t = 0), the 
consumer simply takes the offered (and presumably “abusive”) con-
tract terms and pays an effective price of p. However, if the consumer 
                                                                                                                    
 59. See Chakravarthi Narasimhan, A Price Discrimination Theory of Coupons, 3 
MARKETING SCI. 128 (1984).  
 60. See Raymond Chiang & Chester S. Spatt, Imperfect Price Discrimination and Wel-
fare, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 155 (1982). 
 61. Id. at 157-67.  
 62. Id. at 155-57.  
 63. Id. at 155. 
 64. Id. at 157. 
 65. This restriction is imposed solely to expedite the discussion. As shown in the more 
general model presented by Chiang and Spatt, dropping these restrictions generates con-
clusions that carry the same intuition. 
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spends time bargaining, he can improve the contract terms such that 
( 0)t p pβ > < . That is, his real price will be less than the nominal 
price because the governing contract terms will be more favorable to 
him if he spends time bargaining. Presumably there is some mini-
mum real price that serves as the seller’s reservation price, which 
will serve as the stopping point for the seller. 
 The seller’s maximization problem will then be to develop a form 
contract and nominal sales price that generate the highest profit 
from the two customers. If we assume that the customers do not dif-
fer in their bargaining abilities,66 the seller will develop a bargaining 
schedule ( )t pβ  that maximizes the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 2t p t p t t Cβ β ϕ+ − ⋅ + − ⋅ , where ϕ  represents the seller’s 
per unit time cost and C represents the constant cost of production. 
In the way I have set up the maximand, if the seller chooses not to 
price discriminate, he will simply choose the p that maximizes profit 
with zero time spent bargaining. Assuming an interior solution, this 
p will be equal to the low person’s value if 2 L Hv v⋅ > , or it will be 
equal to the high person’s value if 2H Lv v> ⋅ . However, under a 
range of conditions, the seller might be able to improve his profit if 
he price discriminates. 
 To effectively price discriminate, the seller needs to impose four 
additional conditions on his maximization problem. First, he needs to 
include participation constraints for each buyer, such that each is 
better off purchasing the good than not purchasing the good. Thus: 
( )
( )
1 1
2 2
0
0
H
L
v t p Ht
v t p Lt
β
β
− − >
− − >
 
 Also, to avoid the possibility that either customer will find it ad-
vantageous to select the contract that was meant for the other cus-
tomer, the seller must impose self-selection or incentive-compatibility 
constraints such that: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
2 2 1 1
H H
L L
v t p Ht v t p Ht
v t p Lt v t p Lt
β β
β β
− − > − −
− − > − −
 
 Given the assumptions about the relevant parameters, only the 
low-value customer’s participation constraint and the high-value cus-
tomer’s self-selection constraint will bind. That is, there is no rele-
                                                                                                                    
 66. Bargaining ability presumably includes the speed of reading the contract and 
comprehension of the terms (that is, the ability to price the terms). This assumption could 
be relaxed in a more general model, but the underlying intuition would not change. 
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vant set of contracts and prices that would entice the low-value per-
son to purchase the good without also enticing the high-value person 
to purchase the good (given that the seller also values time). Further, 
there is no concern that the low-value person will attempt to pose as 
the high-value person. 
 Assuming that a separating equilibrium exists, the seller’s strat-
egy can be represented by the following graph: 
In the graph, A and C represent the two contracts that will be offered 
in the separating equilibrium. The high-value customer will pay the 
nominal price, will not bargain over any of the contract terms, and 
will reach the A contract terms, while the low-value customer will in-
vest time bargaining to reach the C contract terms. Effectively, the 
seller exploits the consumers’ differences in time values to induce 
them to reveal their value type, earning greater profits than he 
would make if he chose either of the pooling contracts individually 
(A, where he sells just to the high-value person, or B, where he sells 
to both people at a lower effective price). 
 Whether this price discrimination scheme is stable depends on the 
underlying market. If some fixed cost is required to operate in this 
market, this strategy could be sustainable and even the second most 
efficient, as there may be no economic rents accruing to the seller in 
the long term. Short-term revenues would simply serve as the nor-
mal return for the up-front investment. If revenues yielded an eco-
nomic profit, other firms would undertake the fixed cost to enter the 
market, but there is no reason why a separating equilibrium would 
not be sustainable. Obviously, if there are stronger barriers to entry, 
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the firm could sustain the separating equilibrium and earn economic 
profits. 
 While this price discrimination argument is consistent with stan-
dardized contract terms that do not favor consumers, it is not neces-
sarily superior to Korobkin’s explanation (or other explanations yet 
to be identified). As discussed in the section on his behavioral bias 
explanation, it is necessary to identify what this model predicts 
about cross-sectional variation. 
 Two components of the model are very helpful in terms of compar-
ing its predictive power relative to Korobkin’s. First, while Korob-
kin’s model implies that abusive standardized terms should be more 
likely to appear when consumers are more homogenous,67 the price 
discrimination model suggests that abusive terms are more likely 
when consumer heterogeneity is greater. That is, a separating equi-
librium is more likely to be optimal when there is relatively high 
variance in consumer preferences. In Korobkin’s illustrations, it is 
clear that homogeneity in preferences will imply that relatively more 
product attributes are non-salient.68 Thus, in empirical research, the 
two hypotheses have directly opposite predictions about the correla-
tion between consumer heterogeneity and the incidence of abusive 
standardized terms.69 
 The second component of the price discrimination model that 
could be exploited is the requirement that there are no arbitrage op-
portunities. That is, if resale of the product is relatively easy, low-
time-value consumers could acquire the product at the lower effective 
price and then resell it to the high-value consumers. Such arbitrage 
opportunities will make the price discrimination equilibrium unsta-
ble, and the seller will default to one of the pooling equilibriums. 
This component is useful because there is no obvious connection be-
tween ease of resale and Korobkin’s behavioral bias explanation. 
While the behavioral explanation implies no correlation between ar-
bitrage opportunities and abusive standardized terms, the price dis-
                                                                                                                    
 67. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1235-39.  
 68. See id.  
 69. Some of Korobkin’s comments delivered in this Symposium, where this Article 
was first presented, suggest a useful testable implication of the price discrimination model. 
Specifically, Korobkin mentioned that we might expect more niche marketing in a price 
discrimination context. My interpretation of this comment is that it would be possible to 
exploit systematic differences between high- and low-time-value individuals to proxy for 
discount rates in examining the relationship between the incidence of form contracts and 
time values. For example, if we make the plausible assumption that only low-time-value 
individuals will be willing to shop at specialty stores (because specialty stores entail more 
search costs and do not allow for economies of scale in shopping) while both types will be 
willing to shop at “one-stop” shopping outlets, we might expect a higher incidence of “abu-
sive” form contract terms at the latter outlets relative to the former if the price discrimina-
tion model is predictive. 
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crimination model suggests that there should be fewer abusive stan-
dardized terms in markets where resale is easy.70 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 While I am not aware of any comprehensive dataset, aggregated 
at either the firm or the industry level, empirical testing is clearly 
important before we advance policy prescriptions regarding the 
treatment of standardized terms in the courts. While we might wish 
to protect consumers from their cognitive biases (though we should 
worry about the attendant moral hazard), it is not obvious that we 
should be troubled by a seller’s ability to induce consumers to self-
select the deal that they want on the basis of their time preferences. 
Indeed, this kind of price discrimination takes place in many forms 
without prompting condemnation. If standard form contracts serve 
the same purpose as coupons,71 it probably does not make sense to 
discourage them through the courts. 
 As a broader matter, we need to be more hesitant in using in-
sights from psychology to rationalize unexpected empirical observa-
tions ex post. In gaining from interdisciplinary trade with the field of 
psychology, law and economics scholars must be careful to retain the 
virtues that have made economics the imperial science. Careful ex 
ante specification generates testable hypotheses about cross-sectional 
and time-series variation and allows us to construct powerful statis-
tical tests. Failure to confirm a particular hypothesis does not imme-
diately suggest that a different hypothesis is correct even if experi-
mental evidence suggests that it is consistent with what we observe. 
Instead, we should allow experimental evidence to suggest alternate 
hypotheses and to inform our modeling assumptions, but specifying a 
model is still important if we hope to develop powerful tests. These 
are all necessary conditions for generating robust and effective policy 
prescriptions. 
                                                                                                                    
 70. To illustrate, the price discrimination model would be consistent with the casual 
observation that rental services (for example, car rentals, hotels, and the like) appear to 
exhibit a relatively high incidence of potentially abusive standardized terms, given that re-
sale of rental services is fairly difficult. For that matter, we might expect that services, in 
general, are more likely to come bundled with abusive terms than are goods, since resale is 
easier with goods. 
 71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (analogizing bargaining to clipping cou-
pons). 

